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The author is a professor of finance on the Stanford Graduate College of Enterprise and a senior fellow on the Hoover Establishment
The US banking system is burdened by a convoluted regulatory structure, the place a number of businesses — federal and state — oversee monetary establishments with overlapping jurisdictions and, at occasions, competing pursuits.
This fragmented construction, initially supposed to boost oversight, usually creates inefficiencies, delays and inconsistencies in enforcement. Donald Trump’s incoming administration now has a chance to handle a few of these flaws.
The failures of Silicon Valley Financial institution and First Republic Financial institution, the place regulators shifted blame and acted too late, reveal a system that’s reactive relatively than proactive. It’s time to query extra whether or not this multi-regulator framework really fosters stability or as an alternative stifles innovation, responsiveness, and accountability.
Practically 70 per cent of economic banks within the US, together with SVB and First Republic, function beneath a twin regulatory system the place state and federal regulators alternate oversight. Some banks are additionally regulated by a number of federal regulators such because the Workplace of the Comptroller of the Foreign money and the Federal Deposit Insurance coverage Company.
Proponents argue this enhances resilience by providing a number of views and reduces political interference by giving banks some alternative over their main regulator. Nevertheless, this construction additionally has clear prices: inconsistent enforcement, regulatory arbitrage and delays in addressing rising dangers.
The 2008 collapse of Washington Mutual, the largest bank failure in US historical past, is a living proof. A congressional investigation discovered that WaMu’s downfall was exacerbated by oversight points between the Workplace of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC. Their incapability to behave decisively, attributable to poor co-ordination, allowed vulnerabilities to fester.
Latest occasions mirror the persistence of those points. At SVB, as an example, early warning indicators — its bond portfolio losses and concentrated depositor base — went unaddressed, with regulators both failing to implement requirements or having their efforts diluted by overlapping authorities. Analysis reveals that such inconsistencies create alternatives for regulatory arbitrage, the place banks exploit disparities to interact in riskier practices.
These issues lengthen past banks to the rising fintech sector. Non-bank and fintech companies are driving innovation in funds and lending, but jurisdictional battles amongst regulators, state versus federal and even between federal businesses, have stalled the event of sound regulatory frameworks.
Streamlining the regulatory framework is tough. Any important consolidation regulation would require congressional approval, a problem that has traditionally derailed broader reforms. For example, whereas the Workplace of Thrift Supervision was eradicated beneath the Dodd-Frank reforms after the monetary disaster in response to Washington Mutual’s collapse, extra consolidation efforts confronted sturdy political resistance. Likewise eliminating the entrenched twin Federal and state financial institution regulatory system altogether could also be impractical.
However far more could be executed by the Trump administration to focus on pointless duplication and enhance co-ordination. It ought to search to consolidate oversight duties between the regulatory our bodies, tackle inefficiencies between federal and state regulators, and implement instruments corresponding to a efficiency scorecard to evaluate regulators. A transparent instance of regulatory overlap is the twin oversight of nationwide banks by the OCC and the FDIC, each of which conduct separate examinations of the identical establishments.
Importantly, it might probably additionally align regulatory incentives to make sure businesses prioritise monetary stability and sound supervision over bureaucratic pursuits. It’s also time to problem the idea that extra regulation equals extra security. Overregulation imposes heavy prices, compliance bills alone have risen by almost $50bn yearly for monetary establishments since 2008, and disproportionately harms smaller banks. Moderately than including countless layers of oversight, reform should emphasise accountability: banks ought to bear the results of their dangers.
The US banking system stays very important to international finance, however its outdated regulatory structure threatens its resilience and public belief. By lowering complexity, fostering accountability and aligning incentives, we will create a wiser, leaner framework that promotes each stability and innovation, permitting American finance to thrive and prepared the ground ahead.